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The Nature and Causes of Business Cycles
ECONOMIC change is a law of life. Nowadays, we
commonly associate economic instability with business booms
and recessions, and we have become accustomed to speaking
of these vicissitudes in economic fortune as the "business
cycle." However, economic instability has been man's lot
through the ages, whether he has made his living by hunting
and fishing, by cultivating crops, or by practicing the arts of
commerce, industry, and finance. Economic history discloses
endless variations of economic conditions. Even the meaning
of "good times" keeps changing as the aspirations of people
and their performance undergo changes. But relative to the
standards of each age and place, some years are prosperous,
others dull, still others depressed.
I. TYPES OF ECONOMIC MOVEMENT
The outstanding feature of modern industrial nations is the
growth of their economies. Thus, the population of the United
States has risen steadily, year in and year out. So too, with very
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few exceptions, has the stock of housing, industrial plant, ma-
chinery, school buildings, highways, and other major forms of
capital. The gross national product—that is, the total output of
commodities and services—has fluctuated continually, but has
done so along a rising secular trend. So also has output per
capita, per worker, or per man-hour worked. In short, the
American economy, viewed in the aggregate, has been basi-
cally characterized by growth of resources, growth of output,
and growth of efficiency.
When we look beneath the surface of aggregate economic
activity, we find some industries and communities growing
rapidly, others growing only gradually, and still others declin-
ing. These divergent trends reflect a host of influences—among
them, business innovations, population changes, shifts in con-
sumer preferences, the discovery of new mines or oil fields, the
exhaustion of old mines or timberlands, and changes in gov-
ernmental policies. For example, the capital invested in Ameri-
can railroads and their volume of traffic increased rapidly
during the nineteenth century, responding to the economic
growth of the country and in turn stimulating it. But the rail-
roads also grew at the expense of coaches, canals, and other
waterways, which they gradually superseded by offering better
service or charging a lower price. Years later the competitive
trend was reversed, as new methods of transportation came
into being—first, trolley lines, then buses, trucks, passenger au-
tomobiles,pipelines,airplanes, and improved waterways.
These battled the railroads for traffic as vigorously as railroads
in their youth had fought theft commercial rivals. More re-
cently, railroads have begun to retaliate through the use of
radically new freight cars and other innovations. Such diver-
gence of industrial trends is one of the expressions of economic
progress.
Business cycles have been intimately connected with theThe Nature and Causes of Business Cycles5
lopsided surges of development that mark economic progress.
However, business cycles are not the only type of fluctuation to
which economic life is subject. During certain hours of the
day, most of us are at school or at work; during other hours we
relax in whatever way suits our tastes or needs. This daily cycle
in activity is so regular and dependable that we take it for
granted. The same is true of the weekly cycle which brings its
day or days of rest. Whatever difficulties or opportunities the
daily and weekly cycles may have posed for our remote ances-
tors, our own lives and social institutions have become adjusted
to their repetitive course. We know that shops will be closed at
certain hours and on certain days, and we plan our shopping
accordingly. We know that the nation's production will decline
abruptly when factory workers put down their tools in the late
afternoon, but we also know that their jobs do not cease on
that account and that they will take up their tools again the
next morning or when the weekend is over. In view of the ex-
treme brevity and regularity of these cyclical movements, we
pay no attention to them in judging whether business is im-
proving or worsening.
Much the same is true of the seasonal fluctuations that run
their course within the period of a year. Partly because of
vagaries of the weather or the calendar, partly because of
changes in business practice, the annual cycle is less regular
than the daily or weekly cycle. Nevertheless, we expect busi-
ness in general to be more brisk in the spring than in the sum-
mer or winter, and we ordinarily find it so. We expect depart-
ment store sales to reach a peak during the Easter shopping
season and a still higher peak before Christmas, and so we find
it. We expect unemployment to be at its highest in February
and at its lowest in October, and so it usually is. Workers in
seasonal trades may not cherish the fluctuation to which they
are subject, but they can reasonably count on returning to their6The Business Cycle in a Changing World
jobs when the dull season ends and can plan their lives accord-
ingly. In view of the substantial regularity of seasonal fluctua-
lions, businessmen as well as economists usually put them out
of sight when they seek to determine whether a particular
branch of trade—or the economy as a whole—is expanding or
contracting.
Business cycles differ in vital respects from these daily,
weekly, and annual cycles. First, the recurring sequence of
changes that constitutes a business cycle—expansion, down-
turn, contraction, and upturn—is not periodic. In other words,
the phases of business cycles repeat themselves, but their
duration varies considerably and so too does their intensity
and scope. Second, since business cycles last from about
two to ten years, they are considerably longer than the other
cycles. Third, business cycles have a more powerful tendency
to synchronize industrial, commerical, and financial processes
than do the shorter cycles. Thus, the daily and weekly cycles in
total production have no counterpart in inventories, bank
loans, or interest rates, while seasonal fluctuations vary widely
from one business activity to another. Fourth, although custom
has left its imprint on the daily and annual cycles, they are
part of the natural environment of man. Business cycles, on the
other hand, are a product of culture. They are found only in
modem nations where economic activitiesare organized
mainly through business enterprises and where individuals
enjoy considerable freedom in producing, pricing, trading, and
saving or investing.
When economic plans and decisions are made indepen-
dently by millions of business firms and households, some im-
balance is frequently bound to occur between output and
sales, or between output and the stock of equipment, or be-
tween inventories and outstanding orders, or between costs of
production and prices. This much can be reasonably antici-The Nature and Causes of Business Cycles7
pated by everyone. However, the locus of the imbalance, its
timing and magnitude, and the adjustments to which it leads
can rarely, if ever, be foreseen with precision. In short, the
business cycle lacks the brevity, the simplicity, the regularity,
and dependability, or the predictability of its cousins. For all
these reasons, although the business cycle is often the vehicle
of progress, it also spells instability for society. When the
economy starts on a downward course, no one can be sure how
many months the recession will last, whether it will degenerate
into a depession, how many business firms will go bankrupt,
bow far prices will decline, and—most important of all from a
human standpoint—how many men and women will become
unemployed. Although the United States and other countries
are learning rapidly how to adapt to business cycles and to
bring them under control, they remain troublesome.
Business cycles are not merely fluctuations in aggregate eco-
nomic activity. They are also fluctuations that are widely
diffused throughout the economy, and this fact distinguishes
them from the convulsions of economic fortune that character-
ized earlier limes as well as from the other short-term varia-
tions of our own age. Continuous and fairly pervasive fluctua-
tions do not arise in a nation's economy until its activities of
production,distribution,andconsumption have become
closely interwoven through division of labor, the making and
spending of money incomes, a system of banking and credit, a
mode of production relying extensively on fixed capital, and
some ease in communication and transportation. Since these
institutions emerged gradually in the Western world, the phe-
nomenon of business cycles itself developed gradually and no
precise date can be assigned for its first mature expression. It
appears, however, that business cycles have existed in the
United States, Great Britain, and France for nearly two hun-
dred years, and that they have marked the economies of other8TheBusinessCycle in a Changing World
modem nations practicing free enterprise since the latter part
of the nineteenth century—if not longer. Earlier centuries,
while free from business cycles, did not escape the ordeal of
economic instability. This is evident from the hardships that
frequently accompanied or followed bad harvests, epidemics,
wars, earthquakes, monetary upheavals, high-handed• acts of
rulers, civil disorders, and similar fortuitous events.
In recent decades, the Soviet Union and other nations that
organize economic activity through state enterprises and gov-
ernmental edicts have also escaped business cycles; but they
have not escaped economic fluctuations. Variations in harvests,
political purges, wars, monetary revolutions, and misadven-
tures, as well as successes of planning, have left their mark on
the aggregate economic activity of these nations. Of course,
episodic or erratic disturbances also powerfully influence the
course of economic activity in the United States and in other
developed nations that practice free enterprise, but they ap-
pear to do so by hastening or retarding, by strengthening or
opposing, the economic processes that of themselves tend to
generate cyclical movements. The ragged contours of most
business cyles testify to the role of random disturbances, and
so too does the strong individuality of successive business
cycles.
Business cycles also need to be distinguished from specific
cycles—that is, cycles in specific activities, such as mining coal
or trading in securities, which have about the same order of
duration as the business cycle but may or may not match its
timing. Occasionally, specific cycles appear to be superim-
posed, so to speak, on longer cycles marked by their own rises
and declines. Huge swings, lasting about ten to twenty-five
years, have been common in building construction in various
countries. Waves of this order of duration, but consisting of ac-
celerations and retardations of growth rather than of actualThe Nature and Causes of Business Cycles9
rises and declines, also appear to have characterized aggregate
economic activity in the United States. These Kuznets cycles,
as they are often called, reflect variations in the intensity of
successive business cycles. A distinction between major and
minor cycles, such as Hansen makes, likewise involves a group-
ing of successive business cycles. On this view, the interval be-
tween the troughs of severe depressions is a major cycle, so
that some major cycles may include only one business cycle
while others include two or more. Long waves of about fifty
years—usually called Kondratieff cycles—have also been al-
leged to characterize aggregate economic activity of Western
nations. The existence of these waves, while suggested by price
movements, has not yet been established.
The terms used by economists to describe the phases of
business cycles are rich in diversity but are gradually becoming
standardized. The "peak" of a business cycle marks the end of
"expansion" and the beginning of "contraction." The "trough"
marks the end of contraction and the beginning of expansion.
Frequently, "prosperity" is used interchangeably with "expan-
sion," although it is better practice to restrict terms such as
"prosperity" or "boom" to the higher reaches of particular ex-
pansions when full employment is closely approximated. The
term "recession" does double duty. It is widely used to refer to
the transition from expansion to contraction, just as "recovery"
or "revival" is used to refer to the transition from contraction to
expansion. Contractions of varying intensity are also com-
monly distinguished by the terms "recession" and "depression";
the former refers to a moderate contraction of aggregate activ-
ity that lasts in the neighborhood of a year, while the latter
refers to a severe contraction or to one which, while moderate,
lasts distinctly longer than a year. The term "crisis" originally
was used to denote the financial disturbances that frequently
occurred during the transition from expansion to contraction,10The Business Cycle in a Changing World
but later it came to be applied to any transition from expan-
sion to contraction. Nowadays, the term "crisis" is usually re-
served for a violent disruption of financial markets without
regard to the stage of the business cycle in which such a dis-
turbance occurs.
II. GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE ABOUT
BUSINESS CYCLES
In view of the complexity of business cycles and the innumer-
able differences between them, their essential features and
causes have long been a matter of debate. The lack of full or
precise economic statistics, which was especially serious before
World War I, inevitably contributed to uncertainty about the
actual course of business cycles and theft causes. But as public
concern about crises, inflation, depressions, and unemployment
grew, economists have also pressed their investigation of this
range of problems.
During much of the nineteenth century, interest was focused
on commerical crises—that is, the sharp rise of money rates,
scramble for liquidity, drop of prices, and spread of bankrupt-
cies that frequently marked the culmination of a boom. With
the emergence of the concept of a business cycle, various
economists became concerned with the entire round of events
that preceded and followed a crisis. The business cycle itself,
however, was still viewed as centering, in the main, in activi-
ties of commerce and finance. Some economists traced its
causes to natural forces, others to psychological factors, and
still others to the workings of the monetary and banking sys-
tem. Toward the end of the century, interest began to shift to
phenomena of industry and ernployrnent, and more particu-
larly to the great fluctuations that characterized the capital
goods industries. This change of outlook reflected the growthThe Nature and Causes of Business Cycles11
of manufacturing, transportation, and public utility enterprises
in modern nations, the relative decline of agriculture, and a
growing realization that the transition from prosperity to re-
cession could occur without a crisis or panic but not without a
substantial increase of unemployment. In later decades, nu-
merous explanations of the business cycle were developed that
gave a large role to investment—usually to investment in fixed
capital but sometimes to investment in inventories. Economists
stressed different factors that had a bearing on the investment
process—such as population growth, territorial expansion,
stock of capital, the state of optimism, new technology, bunch-
ing of innovations, the rate of change in consumption, varia-
tion of interest rates, and changes of costs, prices, and profits.
Or else they attributed primary significance to particular fea-
tures of economic organization—such as industrial competi-
tion, uncertainty of demand, or the inequality of incomes.
More frequently than not, the various theories differed mainly
in their points of emphasis and therefore served to supplement
one another.
The truly outstanding contributions to knowledge of busi-
ness cycles were made by a small number of economists.
Clement Juglar, 1819—1905, pioneered by demonstrating, in
the course of a massive factual study of prices and finance, that
crises were merely a passing phase of a recurring, wavelike
fluctuation in business activity. Milchail Tugan-Baranovskii,
1865—1919, was the first influential economist to see in the
fluctuating rate of growth of the fixed capital of a country the
main cause of its business cycles. Knut Wicksell, 1851—1926,
clarified the cumulative processes of the business cycle by ana-
lyzing the consequences of a discrepancy between the rate of
return on investment, which was liable to shift because of
technological or other real changes in opportunity, and the
market rate of interest. Albert Aftalion, 1874—1956, developed12The Business Cycle in a Changing World
the implications for the business cycle of certain industrial
facts—the long period required to bring new fixed capital into
being, the long life of capital goods, and the capacity of minor
changes in consumption to generate large changes in the net
additions to the fixed capital required by business firms. Joseph
A. Schumpeter, 1883—1950, viewed economic growth itself as a
cyclical process and attributed the business cycle to the bunch-
ing of innovations, which forced difficult readjustments on old
enterprises but in the end resulted in a more effective use of
existing resources. Wesley Clair Mitchell, 1874—1948, carried
factual investigation of business cycles far beyond earlier
efforts, sharpened the concept of a sell-generating cycle in a
business system, and clarified the interrelations of costs, prices,
and profits during a business cycle. John Maynard Keynes,
1883—1946, stressed the dynamic role of investment in altering
the level of national income, formulated a consumption func-
lion which treats consumer spending as a passive response to
national income, and with the aid of this function clarified the
process whereby an increment of investment, besides adding
directly to a nation's income, raises it indirectly by stimulating
larger consumer spending. Through the contributions of these
pioneers and of many other economists and economic statisti-
cians, notably Warren M. Persons, Simon Kuznets, and Jan
Tinbergen, significant advances have been made in recent
decades in describing with some precision the major features
of business cycles and also in understanding the processes
whereby they are generated.
This paper presents in nontechnical language the main re-
sults of modern research on the nature and causes of business
cycles. It should be borne in mind, however, that the concrete
manifestations of the business cycle keep changing and that
numerous aspects of business cycles are still obscure. These
facts justify extensive new research. The investigations thatThe Nature and Causes of Business Cycles13
economists have currently under way focus on speculative
model building, econometric model building, historical studies
of individual cycles, statistical studies of fluctuations in indi-
vidual processes or in the economy at large, experiments with
forecasting techniques, and studies of business-cycle policy.
This variety of approaches sometimes leads to methodological
controversies. But no serious student of business cycles any
longer questions that empirical research must be guided by an
analytic framework or that speculative theorizing must be
tested by an appeal to experience.
III. CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR OF AGGREGATE
ACTIVITY
The business cycle to some degree the entire system of
business—the formation of firms and theft disappearance,
prices as well as output, the employment of labor and other
resources, costs and profits, the flow of incomes to individuals
and consumer spending, savings and investments, exports and
imports, trading in securities as well as commodities, the exten-
sion and repayment of loans, the money supply and its turn-
over, and the fiscal operations of government. Since there is no
unique way of combining all these activities, the business cy-
cle cannot be fully depicted by any single measure. However,
the behavior of the entire congeries of fluctuations is indicated
reasonably well for recent decades by statistical series of fairly
comprehensive economic coveragc—such as industrial produc-
tion, total or nonagricultural employment, the flow of personal
income, bank clearings or debits, and the gross national
product.
The picture of a typical business cycle which emerges from
these statistical records and also from earlier historical descrip-
tions is that of a sustained rise in aggregate economic activity14The Business Cycle in a Changing World
followed by a sustained, but smaller and shorter, decline. Ac-
tivity at the peak of a business cycle is not merely higher than
at the immediately preceding and following troughs. With
very rare exceptions, it is also higher than at the preceding
peak and lower than at the following peak. Likewise, the
trough of a business cycle is usually higher than its immediate
predecessor. In view of these typical characteristics, a business
cycle almost always includes a visible element of growth. It is
not merely an oscillation. The expansion, which ultimately
carries aggregate activity to new heights, is typically most
rapid in its early stages—the more so when it follows a severe
contraction than when it fcfflows a mild one. Although the rate
of advance usually tapers off as the expansion proceeds, at
limes it reaccelerates as an expansion draws to a close without,
however, regaining its initial speed. During contractions the
rate of decline is usually fastest in the middle stages.
Between 1854 and 1961 the average length of business cycles
in the United States was forty-nine months, with the average
expansion lasting thirty months and the average contraction
nineteen. The duration of individual cycles varied considerably
—from ten to eighty months for expansions, from seven to sixty-
five months for contractions, and from seventeen to one hun-
dred and one months for full cycles. In a sense, aggregate
activity was "depressed" over longer intervals than the dura-
tion of contractions may suggest, since some time must elapse
before recovery can restore activity to the level attained at the
preceding cyclical peak. On the other hand, the level of activ-
ity in the months immediately following a peak is often only a
little lower than at the peak. During the ten business cycles
from 1919 to 1961, when expansions averaged thirty-five
months and contractions fifteen, the increases of industrial pro-
duction ranged from 18 to 93 per cent and averaged 38 per
cent, while the declines ranged from seven to 66 per cent andThe Nature and Causes of Business Cycles15
averaged 26 per cent. Total output and employment, however,
have fluctuated within decidedly narrower ranges. The reason
is that they encompass, besides volatile activities likemanu-
facturing and mining, relatively stable activities such as re-
tailing, the service trades, and governmental work. Thus,
during the business-cycle contraction of 1957—58, when indus-
trial production declined 14.2 per cent, total real output fell
only 4.6 per cent and employment in nonagricultural establish-
ments 4.3 per cent (see Table 1.1 and Chart 1.1).
In other industrial countries the average duration of business
cycles has been somewhat longer than in the United States.
For example, between 1879 and 1932, fifteen business cycles
ran their course in the United States, but only ten in Germany,
and eleven in Great Britain and France. Typically, the ampli-
tude of business cycles has also been smaller in other countries
than in the United States. Although the business cycles of mdi-
vidual countries often synchronize, some divergence of eco-
nomic fortune has always been present. In general, the minor
cycles of individual nations have followed a relatively indepen-
dent course, while the larger cyclical movements have tended
to be of international scope.
IV. CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR OF INDIVIDUAL
ACTIVITIES
Many, but by no means all, individual activities reflect the
cyclical movements of comprehensive aggregates of economic
activity. The fortunes of individual firms are often dominated
by personal factors or conditions peculiar to their industry or
locality. Activities like the production of wheat experience fluc-
tuations that are heavily influenced by the weather and bear
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States, 1919—65 a
a Tindicates trough; P indicates peak; shaded areas represent business-cycle
contractions; unshaded areas represent expansions. Data are quarterly, except for
the following, which are annual: GNP in current dollars, 1919—38; CNP in 1958
dollars, 1919—46; employment, 1919-28; unemployment rate, 1919—39.The Nature andCausesof Business Cycles19
production of new products, like radio tubes in the 1920's or
transistors more recently, may defy business-cycle contractions
during the early and rapidly growing stage of their history.
Some financial magnitudes, like the money supply, decline dur-
ing severe contractions but merely experience a reduced rate
of growth during ordinary contractions. Others, like commer-
cial bank investments or the cash balances of corporations,
tend to move contracycically. Even activities that generally
move with the business cycle sometimes skip a cycle, or un-
dergo an extra fluctuation of their own, or move especially
early or late during recessions or recoveries. In short, some
economic activities are free from cyclical fluctuations over ex-
tended periods or are subject to an independent rhythm, while
even the numerous activities that tend to keep in step with the
business cycle have specific cycles whose turning points are
scattered.
This diversity of movement in various branches of the econ-
omy means that expansion in some activities is always accom-
panied by contraction in others. We find, for example, that
expansions in individual branches of production run side by
side with individual contractions, whether business as a whole
is depressed or prosperous. The turns of the specific cycles are
not, however, distributed at random through time. On the con-
trary, they come in clusters, so that at a time when the troughs
in production are bunched the peaks are few, and vice versa.
But when the number of troughs in a given month exceeds the
peaks, the number of expanding activities must also be larger
the following month. Hence, the bunching of cyclical turns re-
sults, so to speak, in protracted periods when a majority of in-
dividual branches of production experience expansion, fol-
lowed by protracted periods when a majority experience
contraction. Empirically, the periods when expansions pre-
ponderate are virtually coterminous with the upward phases of20The Business Cycle in a Changing World
the cycle in aggregate production; that is to say, aggregate
production expands when individual expansions dominate.
Moreover, when the expanding activities constitute a large ma-
jority, the amplitude of the cyclical rise in total production is
apt to be larger than when the majority is small. To put this
relationship another way, when the cyclical rise of total pro-
duction is especially large, the industrial scope of expansion
also tends to be especially broad. The scope of individual con-
tractions, while usually less extensive than that of expansions,
issimilarly correlated with cyclical declines in aggregate
production. All these relations in the sphere of production
hold, and in the same way, between individual branches of
employment and total employment, between individual bran-
ches of expenditure and total expenditure, and, indeed, be-
tween individual business processes and business as a whole.
The shift from a widening to a narrowing scope of expan-
sions usually takes place gradually and follows a cyclical
course. Rising activities are only a bare majority at the begin-
ning of a business-cycle expansion. Their number swells as ag-
gregate activity increases, though expansion reaches its widest
scope not when aggregate activity is at a peak but perhaps six
months or a year earlier, in the neighborhood of the peak,
crosscurrents are the outstanding feature of the economic situ-
ation. Once the economy turns down, the number of expand-
ing activities becomes smaller and smaller, but the scope of
contraction does not widen indefinitely. Perhaps six months or
a year before aggregate activity reaches a trough, the propor-
tion of contracting activities is already at a maximum. There-
after, the majority of contracting activities dwindles, while the
minority of expanding activities keeps growing and before
long becomes the ruling majority. About the time when that
happens, the tide of aggregate activity begins rising again. A
continual transformation of the economic system thus occursThe Nature andCausesof Business Cycles21
beneath the surface phenomena of aggregate expansion and
contraction.
The degree of clustering and the precise sequence of the
cyclical turns of individual branches of production or employ-
ment vary from one business-cycle turn to the next. New and
rapidly growing industries tend to move down late at down-
turns and to move up early at upturns. Activity in the machin-
ery trades tends to move somewhat late at both upturns and
downturns. Apart from these tendencies, the sequence within
any cluster of cyclical upturns in individual branches of indus-
try usually bears little resemblance to the sequence within the
next cluster of either downturns or upturns.
Rather strong repetitive tendencies emerge, however, when
production and employment are viewed in relation to other
economic processes.Activitiespreparatorytoinvestment
expenditurc—such as the formation of new firms, appropria-
tions for capital expenditure by corporations, issuance of
building permits, contracts for residential building, orders for
machinery and equipment, contracts for commercial and in-
dustrial construction, additions to private debt, and new equity
issues—typically begin declining while total production, em-
ployment, the flow of incomes, and the average level of whole-
sale prices are stiU rising. Similarly, these visible preparations
for investment typically recover several months before produc-
tion, employment, incomes, and wholesale prices end their
cyclical decline. Cyclical fluctuations in profit margins, in the
proportion of corporations achieving rising profits, and in
prices of common stocks also tend to lead the tides of aggregate
activity, and so too—although less consistently—do the fluctu-
ations of total corporate profits. Other activities that tend to
move up early in recoveries and to move down early in reces-
sions are investment in inventories of materials, spot prices of
industrial raw materials, and certain marginal adjustments of22The Business Cycle in a Changing World
the work force, such as the average length of the work week
and the rate of new hirings.
On the other hand, many economic processes or activities
tend to lag in the course of business cycles. Outstanding
among these are labor costs per unit of output, interest rates
charged by banks on business loans, mortgage yields, retail
prices, business expenditures on new plant and equipment, the
installation of new industrial facilities, and aggregate business
inventories. Of course, the cyclical turns in these lagging
processes tend to precede opposite turns in aggregate activity.
The internal composition of the economy keeps changing in
the course of a business cycle but not only on account of differ-
ences in cyclical timing. Just as individual activities do not rise
or fall in perfect unison, so also they do not rise or fall by any
uniform percentage during a business cycle. Some economic
magnitudes—for example, retail sales and bank interest rates
on business loans—move within a range that is narrow relative
to their level. Others—especially business profits, capital gains
or losses, and orders for investment goods—have enormous
fluctuations. These and many other differences of cyclical am-
plitude are a recurring feature of business cycles. The turmoil
that goes on within aggregate economic activity during a busi-
ness cycle is, therefore, in no small part systematic.
In a typical business cycle, aggregate production fluctuates
over a wider range than do aggregate sales. Moreover, sales by
manufacturers fluctuate more widely than sales by wholesalers,
while the latter fluctuate more than sales by retailers. The pro-
duction of durable goods—both those destined for producers
and those destined for consumers—fluctuates more widely
than that of nondurables. Industrial production usually fluc-
tuates more than the level of industrial prices at wholesale,
which in turn fluctuates more than the level of retail prices
or of wage rates. The cyclical fluctuation in the number ofThe Nature and Causes of Business Cycles23
man-hours worked is larger than the fluctuation in the num-
ber employed, and the latter is larger in commodity-producing
industries than in the service trades. Wage disbursements fluc-
tuate within a wider range than salary payments or the flow of
property income to individuals but within a much narrower
range than profits. Corporate profits also fluctuate much more
widely than dividend payments or total personal income. Con-
sumer expenditures fluctuate still less than personal income,
while personal savings fluctuate more than personal income
but less than corporate savings. Cyclical amplitudes are larger
in private investment expenditure as a whole than in consumer
expenditure and they are also larger in consumer spending on
durable goods than on nondurables or services. Again, ampli-
tudes are typically larger in construction contracts than in the
volume of construction executed, larger in business orders for
machinery and equipment than in their production or ship-
ments, larger in additions to inventories by business firms than
in gross or net additions to their fixed capital, and larger in ad-
ditions to inventories of the firms manufacturing durable goods
than of those manufacturing nondurables. Finally, new se-
curity issues fluctuate more widely than trading on the stock
exchanges, stock prices more than commodity or bond prices,
short-term interest rates more than bond yields, open market
interest rates more than customer rates, extensions of consumer
installment credit more than repayments, imports more than
exports, governmental revenues more than expenditures, and
so through the gamut of processes that make up the economy.
Since disparities of cyclical amplitude and timing, such as
those just noted, tend to be repeated in successive business
cycles, the proportions that critical economic factors bear to
one another tend to change in a systematic manner during a
business cyle. For example, investment expenditure fluctuates
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spending; hence the ratio of investment to the gross national
product tends to move with the business cycle, while the ratio
of consumer spending to gross national product traces out an
inverse movement. The amplitude of cycles is larger in total
production than in sales; hence, inventory investment passes
through a cycle of accumulation and liquidation that closely
matches or even leads the cycle in aggregate activity, while the
movement of total inventories lags both in recoveries and re-
cessions. Government expenditures usually fluctuate within a
smaller range or bear a much looser relation to the business
cycle than do revenues; hence, the budgetary surplus, taken in
an algebraic sense, tends to move with the business cycle. One
more illustration will have to suffice. The rate of increase of the
labor force varies little between expansions and contractions of
aggregate activity; employment, on the other hand, moves
strongly and synchronously with the tides in activity but typi-
cally rises more slowly than the labor force both at the begin-
ning and toward the very end of expansion. Unemployment,
therefore, typically turns up before aggregate activity starts re-
ceding and turns down only after economic recovery is already
under way.
The empirical features of business cycles will be further
elucidated in later pages. The point to note now is that our
generalizations are largely based on intensive studies of the
business cycles that have occurred in the Unites States during
recent decades, although considerable confinnation has also
been provided by stud,ies of other countries—notably, Great
Britain, Canada, Italy, and Japan. It is also well to keep in
mind, first, that the generalizations emphasize the repetitive
features of the economic changes that take place during busi-
ness cycles; second, that they merely express strong tendencies
toward repetition—not invariant rules of behavior. Diversity
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than the family resemblance among them, and this fact inevit-
ably complicates the task of understanding the nature and
causes of business cycles. Fortunately, there is less uncertainty
about the broad processes that typically generate business
cycles than about the specific causes of this or that cyclical epi-
sode.
V. THE CUMULATIVE PROCESS OF
EXPANSION
The continual transformation of the economy during a busi-
ness cycle, which we have just reviewed, indicates that once
the forces of recovery have taken hold, they will cumulate in
strength. In other words, the expansion will spread out over
the economic system, gather momentum, and for a time be-
come a self-reinforcing process.
The proximate impulse to expansion may come from an in-
crease of spending by business firms, consumers, or the gov-
ernment, or it may originate outside the domestic economy.
The source or sources of the expansive impulse will be consid-
ered later. For the moment, let us assume merely that the
economy is jarred out of its depressed level by an appreciable
rise in the volume of newly initiated construction. A chain of
familiar consequences will then be set in motion. Contractors
will hire additional labor, disburse larger sums in wages, place
larger orders for materials, supplies, and equipment with deal-
ers or manufacturers, and finance at least a part of their rising
outlays from new bank loans. The employment of labor on
construction sites will at first increase only a little but after a
few weeks or months—as the sequence of technical operations
permits—more rapidly. Sales by retail shops and service estab-
lishments that cater to consumers will follow suit; for most
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income, and some will even feel encouraged to buy on the in-
stallment plan. The impact of the additional spending by con-
tractors and their workmen will be spotty and uneven, but the
effects will gradually spread out. Although some dealers or
manufacturers will be content to meet the enlarged demand by
drawing down their inventories, others will want to maintain
inventories at their current level, and still others will seek to
expand them in order better to accommodate a rising volume
of sales. Here and there, therefore, not only will production
of services and of goods made to specification be stimulated
but also of staples that are normally carried in stock.
In response to larger construction spending, the rough bal-
ance between expanding and contracting enterprises that had
previously ruled in the economy will thus be tipped, albeit ir-
regularly, toward expansion. As firms revise theft production
schedules upward, they also will often increase their purchases
from other firms, give fuller work to their present employees,
perhaps recall some former employees or hire new ones, but in
any event disburse larger sums in wages. Thus, each expanding
center of production will stimulate activity elsewhere, includ-
ing lending by the banks, in ever-widening circles. The spread
of expansion from these centers will serve to check or counter-
act spirals of contraction that meanwhile are being generated
at other points. With the scope of the expansion gradually be-
coming wider, retailers will be more prone to place orders with
theft suppliers in quantities that exceed theft current sales,
wholesalers and manufacturers will behave similarly, working
hours will lengthen here and there, the work force will grow in
an increasing number of firms and in the aggregate, and so too
will income disbursements and sales to consumers.
We have supposed thus far that the higher volume of newly
initiated construction will merely be maintained. In fact, con-
struction work will tend to grow and so too will the activity of
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firms, viewed in the mass, will still be operating well below
capacity; but some firms—and their number is now increasing
—will be operating at or close to full capacity. Moreover, as
production rises, the profits of these firms, and indeed of busi-
ness generally, will tend to improve. For a lime, service
enterprises—shops, theaters, buses, airlines, etc.—can handle
more customers without adding appreciably, if at all, to the
aggregate hours worked by their employees. That is much less
likely to happen in manufacturing and other commodity-
producing establishments. However, since these enterprises
also rely heavily on overhead types of labor, their labor re-
quirements per unit of output will tend to fall as output ex-
pands, thus reinforcing increases of productivity stemming
from improvements of organization or technology. Experience
shows that the swiftest advances of output per man-hour typi-
cally occur in the early stages of a business-cycle expansion
and that they then usually outweigh such increases as may
occur in wage rates. The result is that unit labor costs of pro-
duction tend to decline rather sharply, at least for a few
months. Depreciation charges per unit of output will also be
falling. Meanwhile, such increases as occur in other cost items
are as yet apt to be quite moderate, and they can frequently be
offset by advancing selling prices. Hence, an increasing num-
ber of finns will find that their profit margins are rising hand-
somely and, since their volume of business is also growing, that
their total profits are rising still more. With business profits and
consumer incomes improving on a wide front, with shortages
of capacity looming more frequently, with delivery periods
lengthening, and with interest rates, machinery and equipment
prices, and construction costs still relatively favorable, it is only
natural that contracts and orders for investment goods should
rise briskly. Investment expenditures will follow suit, though
with an irregular lag and diminished amplitude.
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people a feeling of confidence about the economic future—a
mood that may gradually change from optimism to exuber-
ance. As people become more optimistic, they respond more
strongly to such increases of sales, prices, or profits as keep oc-
curring. In other words, a given increase of sales, prices, or
profits evokes a larger business response. An advance of prices,
whether in commodity markets, business salesrooms, or on the
stock exchange, is now more apt to encourage expectations
that prices will go still higher. Increases of sales, improvements
of profits, and delays of deliveries are similarly projected. In
this sort of environment, dishoarding and borrowing become
easier to rationalize and buying rises briskly all around. Many
firms, fearing that they may not get all of the supplies they
will soon need, begin bunching their orders more heavily and
some actually order more than they expect to get. Not a few
investors who had previously postponed action on attractive
projects because the time did not seem right, now decide to go
ahead. The new spirit of enterprise fosters more new projects
that are related loosely, if at all, to the specific shortages of fa-
cilities that keep arising. More business firms brush up their
long-range plans for expansion or modernization. More pro-
moters push projects to exploit new products or techniques.
More new firms are organized to share in the growing markets.
More legislatures authorize improvements worthy of an era of
prosperity. More families decide to buy a new automobile, to
refurnish their home, or to build or buy a new house. Thus,
the widening scope of expansion and the improved outlook
that goes with it foster both investment and consumption, with
advances of the one reinforcing the other in a cumulative
process.
Even an adverse development, such as a strike in a major
industry or a deliberate effort to reduce inventories of some
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of the expansion, any such reversal of fortune could have
sufficed to terminate it. Now, in view of the high level of busi-
ness and consumer optimism and the large backlog of out-
standing commitments for capital goods, a brief inventory
adjustment is merely apt to bring a pause to the growth of ag-
gregate economic activity; once this adjustment is completed
the economy can resume its advance in spirited fashion.
VI. GATHERING FORCES OF RECESSION
And yet, as history so plainly teaches, a general expansion of
economic activity sometimes lasts only a year and rarely lasts
more than three or four years. Why does not the process of ex-
pansion continue indefinitely? And if the expansion must end,
why is it not followed by a high plateau of economic activity
instead of a decline? A partial answer to these questions can
sometimes be found in disturbances that originate outside the
mainstream of the domestic economy—such as political devel-
opments that threaten radical changes in property rights, or a
drastic cut of military expenditures at the end of a war, or a
major crisis abroad. Developments of this nature are entirely
capable of cutting short an expansion that otherwise would
have continued. However, experience strongly suggests that
even in the absence of serious external disturbances the course
of aggregate activity will in time be reversed by restrictive
forces that gradually but insistently come into play as a result
of the expansion process itself.
First, as the expansion continues, the slack in the economy is
taken up and reduced. Although improvements of technology
and new installations keep adding to the capacity of the na-
tion's workshops, production generally rises still faster; hence,
idle or excess capacity diminishes in a growing majority of the
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growing, jobs increase faster; hence, unemployment declines.
Although the reserves of the banking system may be expand-
ing, bank loans and investments generate deposits at a faster
rate; hence, the ratio of reserves to deposits keeps falling. Al-
though producers of metals and other materials and supplies
respond to the brisk demand by raising production schedules,
they are frequently unable to move quickly enough; hence, de-
liveries stretch out or become less dependable. The pecuniary
expression of the mounting shortages is a general rise of prices
—of labor, credit, raw materials, intermediate products, and
finished goods; but that is not all. The shortages are real and
their physical expression is a narrower scope of the expansion
itself. Rising sales by a particular firm or industry still release
forces of physical expansion elsewhere, but their effects are
blunted since more and more businessmen must now contend
with bottlenecks. Once labor is in short supply in a community,
an increase of employment by one firm must often result in
some reduction of employment elsewhere in the same commu-
nity'. Once this or that material is in short supply, some firms
must get along with less than they need or wait longer for de-
liveries. Once the banking system stops expanding credit or
materially reduces its rate of expansion, any new loans to some
firms will affect adversely the ability of other firms to get the
credit they need. Instances of this sort multiply as the econ-
omy moves toward full employment. At some point, there-
fore, the scope of the expansion stops widening and begins
to narrow. Although aggregate activity isstill growing, it
can no longer maintain its initial rapid pace.
Second, the advance of prosperity tends to raise unit costs of
production and therefore threatens profit margins—unless sell-
ing prices rise sufficiently. Taking the business system as a
whole, much the largest item in costs and one which business-
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cost of labor per unit of output. This cost depends, first, on the
hourly wage of labor and, second, on output per man-hour.
Both tend to rise as the expansion progresses, but at unequal
rates. The price of labor moves sluggishly in the early part of
the expansion, but advances of wages tend to become more
frequent and larger as competition for labor increases and
trade unions take advantage of improved market conditions.
Increasing resort to overtime work at premium rates of pay
accentuates the rise in the average price of labor, and so too
does the faster upgrading of workers. On the other hand, out-
put per man-hour, which improved sharply early in the expan-
sion, tends to increase more gradually as the expansion length-
ens, and it may also decline before the expansion is over. To be
sure, improvements in organization and technology continue to
be made at a thousand points at this as at every stage of the
business cycle. However, their effectiveness in raising produc-
tivity is offset by developments that increasingly grow out of
prosperity—such as a decline in the average quality of newly
hired labor, fatigue of both workers and their managers, rest-
lessness among workers and rapid turnover of labor, the need
to put some obsolete plants or equipment back into use, the
need to operate some highly efficient plants beyond their
optimum capacity, and the need or wish to add liberally—once
substantial increases of business have occurred—to indirect or
overhead types of labor. Thus, as the expansion of aggregate
activity continues, increases of productivity tend to diminish or
even vanish, while the price of labor not only rises but tends to
rise faster than productivity. The result is that unit labor costs
of production tend to move up persistently.
Third, the increases of construction costs, equipment prices,
and interest rates that are generated by the expansion process
gradually become of more serious concern to the investing
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reduce the value of existing capital goods at the very time that
it raises the carrying charges on new investments. Higher costs
of new capital goods likewise serve to raise fixed charges. For a
time, optimistic expectations concerning the earnings stream
from new investment projects overpower the restraining influ-
ence of higher costs of capital goods or of higher interest rates,
but they will not do so indefinitely. A firm that expects to earn
20 per cent annually from a new project can overlook a modest
rise of construction costs or interest rates, especially when it
plans to finance the investment from retained earnings or de-
preciation reserves. Not all investors, however, are in such a
fortunate position. Homebuilders, in particular, are sensitive
to a rise of construction and financing costs, partly because
their activities are largely financed by borrowing and partly
because interest charges are a very considerable fraction of the
total cost of operating a dwelling. Experience shows that con-
tracts for residential construction typically turn down before
commitments for any other major category of investment.
Business orders for machinery and equipment, as well as con-
tracts for new factories, commercial buildings, and public util-
ity plants still keep rising for a time. These types of investment
are more responsive to prospective demand than to conditions
of supply; but as the expansion of economic activity becomes
more intense, they too begin to feel the pressure of rising costs.
In deciding to invest in a particular project, a business firm
may have given little heed to recent increases in costs. That
decision, however, must still be followed by another, namely,
whether to get the project under way now or later. Investors
know that they will have the new plant or equipment on their
hands for a long time and that theft annual carrying charges
will depend on the cost of the new capital goods, if not also on
the rate of interest. They have got along thus far without the
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without it for some months or years. If, therefore, they expect
costs to be appreciably lower a year or so from now, they may
well bide thefr time. Such postponements in placing orders and
contracts become more frequent even as business decisions to
invest continue to accumulate.
The rise in construction, equipment, and financing costs dur-
ing an expansion impinges so broadly on the investing class
that it would eventually check the investment boom even if
prosperity were diffused uniformly over the economic commu-
nity. However, this is not the case, and the uneven spread of
profits is still another major development that impedes the
continuance of expansion. At every stage of the business cycle
there are bound to be some firms whose profits are declining or
whose losses are increasing. But these firms are not a steady
fraction of the business population, and there are cogent rea-
sons for expecting their numbers to increase as the expansion
of aggregate activity stretches out. To protect profit margins,
selling prices must rise sufficiently over the entire range of
business enterprise to offset higher unit costs of production.
Since business conditions are good, many firms can and do
raise prices that much or more. But there are always some
firms that find it hard to advance selling prices, and their nuin-
ber tends to grow at an advanced .stage of the expansion. In
some industries, sales have recently been pushed with such
vigor that the markets for their products are approaching satu-
ration at existing prices. In other industries, exaggerated no-
tions concerning the volume of sales that could be made at a
good profit have led to overstocking or overbuilding, so that
prices come under pressure. Errors of this type occur at all
times, but they are likely to be bunched when enthusiasm has
infected a large and widening circle of businessmen. In still
other cases, business custom, long-term contracts, or govern-
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ing prices. Of course, firms that cannot advance selling prices
will try all the harder to resist increases in costs, but such ef-
forts meet with limited success at a time of extensive shortages.
With the rise in unit costs of production continuing across the
business front, more and more firms therefore find that their
profit margins are becoming narrower, thus offsetting the in-
fluence on profits of rising sales or reinforcing the influence of
declining sales—instances of which now become more numer-
ous. We thus find in experience, as we should expect, that after
a business expansion has run for some time, the proportion of
firms enjoying rising profits begins to shrink, although profits
of business in the aggregate still continue to advance.
These developments—the narrowing scope of expansion as
full employment is approached, the rise of unit labor costs, the
rise of financing costs, the rising cost of new capital goods,
the spread of these cost increases across the economy, and the
shrinkage in the proportion of business firms experiencing ris-
ing profits—tend gradually to undermine the expansion of in-
vestment. Prominent among the first to reduce investment
commitments are the firms whose fortunes are waning. Their
curtailments spread doubt among businessmen whose profits
are still rising, many of whom have also become concerned
about prospective profits or have come to feel that construction
and financing costs will recede before long from the abnormal
level to which they have been pushed by prosperity. These at-
titudes and responses are likely to be reflected in some weaken-
ing of stock exchange prices, which in turn will stir fresh
doubts. With investment commitments declining, but actual
expenditures still rising, backlogs of unfilled orders for capital
goods and of uncompleted contracts for business construction
must sooner or later turn down. Meanwhile, uncompleted con-
tracts for residential construction have, in all probability, al-
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eral backlogs induces reductions in orders for raw materials
and parts, and the reduced pressure on suppliers in turn serves
to stabilize, if not lower, prices. Since many of the consumer
trades can now also count on faster deliveries, the orders
placed with their suppliers are likely to turn down as well.
These changes reinforce efforts to adjust inventories that have
already been induced at numerous points by the narrower
scope of expansion and the reduced rate of growth of aggre.
gate activity. For all these reasons, while inventories on hand
still keep rising, investment in inventories begins declining. In
view of the smaller backlogs, business expenditures on fixed
capital will themselves gradually move to a lower level a little
later. Public expenditures may still rise, but they are unlikely
to do so on a sufficient scale to offset the declines of private
investment. The growth of consumer spending, therefore, is re-
tarded, if it does not actually stop. As these adjustments proc
ceed, the balance between expanding and contracting eco-
nomic activities tips steadily toward contraction. The need for
overtime is much reduced, unemployment begins to rise, ag-
gregate production soon turns down—in short, a business
recession gets under way.
VII. THE PROCESS OF CONTRACTION
The course of a typical recession is well known. A decline of
production is accompanied by a reduction in the number of
jobs, besides a reduced work week for many. The flow of
incomes to individuals, therefore, tends to decline, and con-
sumer spending—at least for expensive durable goods—follows
suit. Retailers and wholesalers are now more apt to place or-
ders for merchandise that are below the level of their respec-
tive sales. Many manufacturers, in their turn, also attempt to
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broadresult of these efforts is that production declines more
than sales, and that inventory investment not only declines but
is soon succeeded by liquidation. Meanwhile, quoted prices of
many commodities, especially of raw materials, tend to soften,
and discounts or concessions from list prices become more
numerous and larger. Wage rates, however, are generally
maintained and actually rise here and there. Even when they
decline somewhat, unit costs of production still tend to rise,
perhaps sharply, because it takes lime before overhead costs,
including the employment of indirect types of labor, can be ad-
justed to the lower volume of business. Many finns that are al-
ready experiencing lower profit margins therefore find that
they must put up with still lower margins, while others first
begin to feel the profit squeeze. With sales more often than
not also declining, an increasing majority of businesses now
experience falling profits, bankruptcies become more frequent,
business profits in the aggregatc—which probably began
shrinking before sales did—decline further, and stock ex-
change prices extend their fall as well. In view of these devel-
opments, many businessmen and consumers, even if they are
not actually poorer, become more concerned about the future.
New business commitments for investment in fixed capital
therefore tend to become less numerous, and—unless forces of
recovery soon come into play—investment expenditures of this
type as well as outlays on consumer durables will extend their
decline, which is as yet modest, and reinforce the contraction
process.
As a decline in one sector reacts on another, the economy
may begin spiraling downward on a scale that outruns the
magnitudes that we ordinarily associate with recession. The
likelihood that a depression will develop depends on numerous
factors—among them, the scale of speculation during the pre-
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mitted to grow, whether or not the quality of credit suffered
significant deterioration, whether any major markets became
temporarily saturated, how much excess capacity had been
created before the recession started, whether and in what de-
gree the balance of international payments has become ad-
verse, the organization of the financial system and its ability to
withstand shocks, the shape of political developments, and the
aptness and scale of monetary actions and other governmental
efforts, if any, to stem the economic decline. If the onset of the
contraction is marked by a financial crisis or if one develops
somewhat later, there is a substantial probability that the de-
cline of aggregate activity will prove severe and perhaps ab-
normally long as well. For when businessmen and their bank-
ers begin to scramble for liquidity, both trade credit and bank
credit will decline and so too will the money supply; com-
modity prices at wholesale and retail will slump and wage
rates decline, while interest rates for a time rise sharply;
confidence will become impaired and many investment pro-
jects will be abandoned instead of merely being postponed;
business losses and bankruptcies will multiply; more workers
will earn less or become totally unemployed; and, since
spells of unemployment also lengthen, more and more f am-
ilies will deplete their savings and be forced to reduce their
spending drastically. Even if the shift from expansion to con-
traction is made gradually, untoward disturbances originat-
ing outside the economy may still strike with great force
and transform a mild contraction into a depression.
VIII. FORCES OF PROGRESS AND RECOVERY
Normally, however, a contraction in aggregate activity does
not lead to depression. A contraction is not a mirror image of
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an oscillation. A contraction does not usually cumulate and
feed on itself in the manner of an expansion. Normally, many
progressive developments continue, and some even become
stronger, during the contraction phase of the business cycle; in
other words, the forces making for contraction are powerfully
counteracted by forces of growth that limit the degree to
which it can cumulate.
What are these forces of growth? First, businessmen and
consumers in a modem nation are accustomed to seeking and
to expecting economic improvement. This optimistic state of
mind generally continues during a contraction, provided its
dimensions remain moderate. Investment opportunities, con-
nected with new technology or market strategy, always keep
arising in the minds of imaginative and resourceful men. Not a
few of these opportunities are acted on promptly in spite of
the recession. Second, most people are extremely reluctant to
give up the standard of living that they have managed to at-
tain, and in any event they cannot quickly readjust family ex-
penditures. Hence, consumer spending is well maintained in
the face of declines of income that are judged to be temporary.
Third, the pitch of both interfirm and interindustry competi-
tion becomes more intense during a recession. Unlike invest-
ment commitments, which are at their highest level before
aggregate activity turns down, the bunching of installations of
new plant and equipment is likely to be heaviest when the re-
cession is well under way. The newer facilities typically serve
new products or permit lower costs of production of old
products. Many progressive enterprises are therefore able to
extend their markets even when business as a whole is falling
off. Firms that suffer from shifts of demand or from an out-
worn technology may have managed to limp along or even do
reasonably well when activity was brisk. Now, finding that
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threatens survival, the hard-pressed firms are more likely to
move with energy to modernize their plant, acquire new
equipment, improve theft products, try out new marketing
strategies, and eliminate waste. Meanwhile, vigorous businesses
whose plants are operating at or close to optimum capacity do
not stand still. Not a few of them anticipate a large expansion
of sales when the dull season is over, and therefore undertake
additions or improvements to their plant and equipment.
Fourth, a nation's resources normally continue to grow even
during a recession. Since the population is still growing, the
stabilizing force of consumption is reinforced. Since the num-
ber of business firms is still increasing, the formation of new
businesses contributes, although at a reduced rate, to the de-
mand for capital goods. Since the stock of housing, consumer
durables, and industrial facilities is still expanding, a large
market is assured for repairs, improvements, and replacements,
although there is undoubtedly some postponing of this type of
expenditure. Fifth, public efforts to promote economic growth
and the general welfare are customary in a well-governed na-
tion. These efforts may not always be wise or geared closely to
the business cycle, but neither are they confined to times of
prosperity. On the contrary, they are more likely to come dur-
ing recessions—cspecially in recent times when full employ-
ment has become an increasingly firm objective of the public
policy of nations.
The progressive forces that operate during recessions serve
as a brake on the cumulative process of contraction. True, ag-
gregate activity falls below the level reached at the peak of
prosperity. The decline, however, is usually of moderate pro-
portions. Not only that, but sales decline much less in the ag-
gregate than production and the level of sales soon becomes
higher than that of production. For a while, the liquidation of
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tinue.To handle the volume of business on hand, especially if
sales stabilize or decline very gradually, manufacturers and
distributors must soon slow down, if not halt, the decline of
their inventories. Taking the economic system as a whole, once
inventory disinvestment declines more rapidly than the decline
of sales, production must begin rising. Of course, a recovery of
production will be preceded by an increase of orders, and an
early upturn of orders is precisely what occurs when dealers
and manufacturers take steps to slow down appreciably the
decline of their inventories.
While business firms keep bringing inventories into better
alignment with their sales, other developments that grow out
of the recession also favor an early recovery. Since the reserves
of commercial banks tend to pile up again, reserve ratios im-
prove. Hence, interest rates decline and credit becomes more
readily available. The effects of easy credit are likely to be felt
most promptly by smaller businesses and the home-building in-
dustry, but they tend to ramify as banks put their reserves to
use. When the demand for loans is still deficient, banks seek
out customers energetically. At the same time, they augment
their investments in bonds, thereby strengthening the bond
market and stimulating a renewed interest in preferred stocks
and gilt-edged common stocks. Meanwhile, numerous read-
justments in the nation's workshops serve to lower unit costs of
production. In view of the decline of aggregate demand,
wage rates often stop rising and sometimes decline a little,
overtime operations become less frequent, not a few of the less
efficient enterprises go out of business, production is increas-
ingly concentrated in the most modern plants and on the best
equipment, many of the less efficient workers are let go, the
ranks of the overhead types of labor are thinned here and
there, and workers generally become more attentive to their
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lion and technology which always occur in a progressive econ-
omy and which are often speeded up during a recession, in re-
sponse to the keener competition that develops at such a time.
Of course, the beneficial changes in the costs of production of
individual businesses are frequently offset or nullified by de-
clining selling prices. However, once the adjustments of inven-
tories have made good headway, commodity prices tend to
stabilize. Hence, more and more firms are apt to find that their
profit margins begin improving. With the prospect of profits
brightening, interest rates declining, and costs of capital goods
lower, some of the numerous investment projects that had pre-
viously been postponed are now revived and they supplement
the new crop of active projects. As these developments become
stronger, the decline of investment commitments ceases, new
firms are established in larger numbers, orders and contracts
for investment goods turn up, inventory disinvestment contin-
ues to ebb, and a recovery of aggregate production and em-
ployment soon gets under way.
Thus, corrective forces released by the recession combine
with the more persistent forces of growth to bring the contrac-
tion of aggregate activity to a halt. Typically, the process
works fairly speedily and the contraction is over in about a
year or a year and a half. However, as previously noted, a con-
traction sometimes develops into a spiraling depression. When
that happens, declining investment in fixed capital supplants
inventory disinvestment as the principal drag on the economy.
Worse still, the stubborn human trait of optimism begins to
give way, so that a mere readjustment of inventories may bring
only an abortive recovery. Once many men begin to lose faith
in themselves or in the institutions of their society, full recov-
ery may need to wait on substantial innovations or an actual
reduction in the stock of fixed capital, unless powerful external
influences come into play—such as a reorganization of the42The Business Cycle in a Changing World
monetary system, massive governmental expenditures, or a
sudden increase of exports on account of foreign develop-
ments. Fortunately, no industrial country has suffered a spiral-
ing depression since World War II, and the likelihood of such
a development—as will be noted later—has been greatly re-
duced.
IX. DIFFERENCES AMONG BUSINESS
CYCLES
The preceding sketch of the nature and causes of business
cycles has stressed typical behavior. Yet no business cycle of
actual experience corresponds precisely to our sketch, and
some cycles bear only a faint resemblance to it. What history
discloses is a succession of business cycles that differ consider-
ably in length, in the intensity of their phases, in the industrial
and financial developments that gain prominence during their
course, and in their geographic scope. In American experience,
for example, while expansions have normally run longer than
contractions, there is no peacetime expansion on record before
1960 that lasted as long as the decline from 1873 to 1879. In-
dustrial production has typically fluctuated over a wider range
than industrial prices, but the opposite is true of several busi-
ness cycles associated with wars. Interest rates have commonly
risen during expansions of aggregate activity, but they contin-
ued to decline during almost the entire expansion from 1933 to
1937. Broad indexes of wholesale prices have generally de-
clined during contractions of activity, but they failed to do so
during the recession of 1890—91 or 1957—58. Contracts and
orders for investment goods have typically moved up be-
fore total production or employment in the recovery process,
but they did not do so at the upturns of 1914 or 1933. Declin-
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cession, but the stock market crash of 1929 came after aggre-
gate activity had already turned down. Some economic
declines, such as those of 1887—88 and 1926—27, were merely
pauses in the growth of the domestic economy. Others,
such as the depression of 1920-21, attained international
scope, while the depression of the 1930's became a world-wide
upheaval of catastrophic proportions.
In view of these and countless other variations among busi-
ness cycles, the causes of any particular cycle are always in
some degree peculiar toit. One prolific source of cycli-
cal variation in the United States, as elsewhere, is found in the
behavior of money, foreign trade, and the balance of pay-
ments. For example, good harvests in 1879, when crops abroad
were poor, stimulated large exports of grain at favorable
prices, thereby improving farmers' incomes, enlarging the
business of shippers, mducrng an inflow of gold, and otherwise
speeding economic recovery. In 1891 and 1892, fear that politi-
cal agitation for free silver would result in abandonment of the
gold standard led to domestic hoarding of gold, to massive
gold shipments abroad, and finally to a financial crisis in the
spring of 1893. The expansion of 1891—93, therefore, devel-
oped nothing like the vigor suggested by our account of the
cumulative process of expansion. The outbreak of war in Eu-
rope in 1914 soon caused a sharp upsurge in American exports,
thereby checking a contraction in aggregate activity that
otherwise might have dragged on. To cite one more illustra-
lion, the expansion of 1958—60 proved incomplete, in large
part because of the restrictive monetary and fiscal policies that
were undertaken by the government to curb inflationary pres-
sures and to prevent further deterioration in the balance of
international payments.
Business-cycle movements often spread from one country to
another and sometimes engulf almost the whole world econ-44The Business Cycle in a Changing World
omy. Foreign trade, commodity prices, stock prices, and inter-
est rates play a vital role in this process of transmission, both
directly and through their influence on business psychology.
The economies of most commercial nations are far more
closely tied to the course of foreign trade and investment than
is the economy of the United States. In view of the large role
of foreign trade in small countries like the Netherlands or Nor-
way, conditions abroad can have a decisive influence on do-
mestic prosperity. Even in a larger country like Great Britain,
an improvement of exports has not infrequently been the im-
mediate cause of economic recovery. However, as the eco-
nomic activity of a nation expands, its imports also tend to rise,
partly because of a larger need for foreign raw materials and
partly because of larger purchases abroad of equipment and
consumer products. Meanwhile, since domestic markets keep
improving, some firms find it more profitable or more con-
venient to cultivate home trade than to push exports. If, in
response to the upswing of activity, domestic costs and prices
advance more rapidly than prices charged by foreign enter-
prises, exports will probably suffer and monetary reserves—
whether of gold or foreign currencies—will tend to diminish.
A restriction of credit often follows, because under a regime
of stable exchange rates the state of a country's balance of
payments and the size of its monetary reserves and borrow-
ing facilities may leave little room for an independent financial
policy. This pattern of developments has become familiar to
the nations of western Europe and to Japan.
Many nations of Latin America, Asia, and Africa derive their
foreign exchange mainly from the export of one or at most a
few raw materials, supplemented by investments made in
these countries by foreignersor,perhaps, by gifts from
abroad. But the prices of internationally traded raw materials
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state of demand in the industrial countries. These price fluctu-
ations often have a critical bearing on the ability of the raw
material producing nations to acquire from abroad the capital
goods and supplies needed to develop their economies.
Not only are the economies of different nations tied together,
but as various theories of long waves or major cycles have
sought to suggest, no business-cycle movement can be under-
stood solely in terms of what happened during that phase or
the one just preceding it. Thus, the American contractions of
1923—24 and 1926—27 were merely minor interruptions of
a great onrush of economic activity from 1921 to 1929. The pe-
riod began with a rapid increase of production, was followed
by a stretch of slower growth, and ended on a note of reaccel-
eration. Financial activities followed a different and more
hectic course. Emerging as an international creditor after the
war, the United States played its new role with exuberance.
Through 1924 the volume of foreign loans was substantial, yet
the loans were on the whole of sound quality—as attested by
later experience. The next few years witnessed a further ex-
pansion of foreign loans and a sharp deterioration of their
quality. The speculative craze expressed itself also in other fi-
nancial areas, notably in the real estate market and superla-
tively in the stock market. Consumer credit shared in the gen-
eral upsurge and made possible a huge expansion in the output
of durable consumer goods during the 1920's, not only abso-
lutely but also relative to total output, thus adding a new
hazard to economic stability. The financial situation was also
made vulnerable by the great pyramiding of international
credits that developed under the gold exchange standard.
Governmental policies in the United States after 1929, which
brought on tax increases and—worse still—tolerated the de-
struction of a third of the nation's money supply, cannot es-
cape a very large part of the responsibility for the Great46The Business Cycle in a Changing World
Depression; but neither financial developments abroad nor the.
course of policy, private and public, in the decade prior to the
depression can go blameless.
X. PROGRESS TOWARD ECONOMIC
STABILITY
Besides such differences among business cycles as we have
noted, which largely reflect episodic iniluences, there are other
differences of a more persistent kind. Just as the business cycle
itself emerged gradually in the course of economic evolution,
so many of its features have undergone changes as the econ-
omy has continued to evolve.
The structure of a nation's economy and its institutions in-
evitably leave their stamp on the character of its cyclical fluc-
tuations. Thus, after the introduction of the Federal Reserve
System, the fluctuations of short-term interest rates in the
United States became narrower, while the lag of long-term in-
terest rates during recoveries and recessions became shorter
and of late has virtually vanished. With the growth of trade
unions and increasing resort to long-term labor contracts, wage
rates have become less responsive to cyclical contractions of
activity. More important still, the precise relations among the
movements of production, employment, and personal income
have kept changing as the structure of the American economy
and its institutions have evolved. During the early decades of
the nineteenth century, when agriculture was the dominant oc-
cupation, occasional declines in the nation's total volume of
production, whether large or small, had little effect on the
number of jobs and sometimes had slight influence even on the
flow of money incomes. Later, as wage jobs gained rapidly in
importance, the movements of employment and personal in-
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numerous changes in the structure of the American economy
have served powerfully to reduce the impact of a cyclical de-
cline of production on the lives and fortunes of individuals.
Important among these changes is the vast expansion of
government, the greatly increased role of the income tax in
public revenues, the shift of income tax collection to a pay-as-
you-go basis, the rapid growth of unemployment insurance
and other programs of social security, the growing frequency
and scale of private pensions, the spread of business corpora-
lions, and their increasing pursuit of stable dividend policies.
As a result of these and related developments, the movement
of personal income is no longer closely linked to the fluctua-
tions of production. For example, in the course of the recession
of 1957—58, the physical volume of industrial production fell
14 per cent and of total production nearly 5 per cent. In the
early decades of this century, aggregate personal income
would have responded decisively to such a decline in produc-
tion. This time government receipts and expenditures offset the
drop in the flow of income from production, first, because
much less was collected in taxes from corporations and indi-
viduals, second, because the amount of unemployment insur-
ance and other social security payments rose. Corporations in
turn reacted to the decline in profits by reducing theft savings
rather than the flow of dividends or pensions to individuals. In
the end, the aggregate of personal incomes, whether before or
after taxes, decJined less than 1 per cent, and in the case of
after-tax incomes even this decline was over before the reces-
sion ended.
Major structural changes have also occurred in the sphere of
employment. Manufacturing, mining, construction, and freight
transportation are the cyclically volatile industries; but their
relative importance as providers of jobs has been gradually de.
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industries has been increasing. In addition, the proportion of
people who work as managers, engineers, scientists, accoun-
tants, secretaries, salesmen, or in kindred "white-collar" occu-
pations has been steadily rising. Much of this type of employ-
ment is of an overhead character and therefore less responsive
to the business cycle than are the jobs of machine operators,
craftsmen, truck drivers, laborers, and others in the "blue-
collar" category. It appears, therefore, that changes in the
structure of the labor force have of late been loosening the
links which, over a considerable part of economic history, lied
the short-mn movements of total employment in the United
States rather firmly to the movements of production. We can
no longer suppose, moreover, when employment falls during a
recession, that there will be a corresponding decline in the
number of people receiving an income. On the contrary, as a
result of the widening sweep of social security programs, the
number of income recipients actually increased during each
recession of the postwar period.
These developments have left an imprint on the behavior of
consumer spending in recent business cycles. First, consumers
have maintained their spending at a high level even after busi-
ness activity had been declining for some months, so that the
cumulative process of contraction has been curbed. Second, re-
tail trade has tended to turn up before production or employ-
ment, instead of lagging during the recovery stage as it did in
earlier times. Thus, consumer spending has emerged as one of
the active factors in arresting recession and hastening recovery.
Of course, if the fluctuations of production had been larger in
the postwar period, the impact of recessions on the lives of
working people would have been greater. On the other hand,
the more stable behavior of personal income and consumption
has itself been a major reason why recent contractions of activ-
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Many other factors have contributed to this result. The need
to overhaul the financial system became clear during the 1930's
and led to numerous reforms, among them the development of
the long-term amortized mortgage, the regulation of stock ex-
changes, the insurance of mortgages, the creation of a secon-
dary market for mortgages, the insurance of savings and loan
accounts, and—most important of all—the insurance of bank
deposits. These financial reforms have served to prevent crises
or the propagation of fear. Even more basic has been the
change in political attitudes that emerged during the 1930's
and which the Congress later articulated in the Employment
Act of 1946. It is now generally agreed that mass unemploy-
ment is intolerable under modem conditions and that the fed-
eral government has a continuing responsibility to promote a
high and rising level of employment and production. In recent
limes, therefore, the business cycle has no longer run a free
course, and this fact has figured prominently in the plans of
businessmen as well as consumers. The general expectation of
the postwar period has been that the government would move
with some vigor to check any recession that developed, and
that its monetary, fiscal, and regulatory actions would con-
tribute to that objective. By and large, this confidence has been
justified by events. Not only has monetary policy in the main
been shaped with a view to promoting stable prosperity, but
fiscal policy—which previously had been handicapped by the
convention of annually balanced budgets—has lately also
been guided by the state of the economy. Business firms too
have been paying closer attention to the business cycle. There
is evidence, in particular, that inventories are being better
managed and that this is helping to moderate the cyclical
swings in production. On the other hand, governmental poli-
cies have often served to intensify inflationary expectations or
pressures, and this has become a recurring problem.50The Business Cycle' in a Changing World
The nations of western Europe have also experienced struc- \turalchanges in the postwar period that, on balance, have
worked in a stabilizing direction. White-collar occupations
have gained in importance, and so too have systems of social
security and of tax collection on a pay-as-you-go basis. Some
countries, especially Sweden, achieved notable success with
contracydical policies well before the United States. Of late,
all of western Europe has been striving energetically and in-
geniously to promote economic expansion and full employ-
ment, and these efforts have been attended by great success.
Even before World War II, the business cycle was a milder
type of fluctuation in western Europe than in the United
States, and the difference has persisted in the postwar period.
Indeed, the main problem facing European nations in recent
years has not been unemployment but rather the difficulties
caused by inflation and balance-of-payments disequilibria.
Japan has also been struggling with this problem.
It would, nevertheless, be premature to conclude that the
older hazards of the business cycle belong to the past. True,
the business cycle has become milder as a result of a favorable
conjuncture of structural changes and of both better and wider
understanding of the requirements of business-cycle policy.
Certainly, there is increasing recognition of the desirability of
preventing recessions, rather than merely acting to moderate
them once they occur. However, the forces that tend to gener-
ate cyclical movements have not vanished in western Europe
or Japan any more than in the United States. It is possible that
in the future a "recession" will mean merely a reduced rate of
growth of aggregate activity instead of an actual and sustained
decline, but there is as yet insufficient ground for believing
that economic developments will generally conform to this
model in the near future. Hence, the wise course for econo-
mists is to continue basic research on the nature and causes ofThe Nature and Causes of Business Cycles51
business cycles, to remain watchful of developments that seem
likely to bring on a slump in activity, and to extend the search
for acceptable pathways to prosperity without inflation.
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